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Abstract
Modern Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition SCADA systems used by
the electric utility industry to monitor and control electric power generation,
transmission and distribution are recognized today as critical components of
the electric power delivery infrastructure. SCADA systems are large, complex
and incorporate increasing numbers of widely distributed components. The
presence of a real time intrusion detection mechanism, which can cope with
different types of attacks, is of great importance, in order to defend a system
against cyber attacks This defense mechanism must be distributed, cheap
and above all accurate, since false positive alarms, or mistakes regarding
the origin of the intrusion mean severe costs for the system. Recently an
integrated detection mechanism, namely IT-OCSVM was proposed, which is
distributed in a SCADA network as a part of a distributed intrusion detection
system (IDS), providing accurate data about the origin and the time of an
intrusion. In this paper we also analyze the architecture of the integrated
detection mechanism and we perform extensive simulations based on real
cyber attacks in a small SCADA testbed in order to evaluate the performance
of the proposed mechanism.
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1. Introduction
Cyber-physical systems are becoming vital for modernizing national crit-
ical infrastructure systems. Cyber attacks often target valuable infrastruc-
ture assets, taking advantage of architectural/technical vulnerabilities or even
weaknesses in defense systems. Most weaknesses in CIs arise from the fact
that many adopt off-the-shelf technologies from the IT world, without a sig-
nificant change in terms of the operator mindset, thus remaining based on
the ”airgap” security principle that falsely assumes that an apparently iso-
lated and obscure system is implicitly secure. Consequently, once a system is
open to receiving off-the-shelf solutions, this increases its exposure to cyber-
attacks.
The proliferation of new technologies, especially Internet-like communi-
cations networks, may introduce some new threats to the security of a smart
grid. In such a network there are three crucial aspects of security that may
be threatened due to the CIA-triad, these being: confidentiality, integrity,
and availability [2]. Confidentiality is the property that information is not
made available or disclosed to unauthorized individuals, entities or processes.
An attack on this occurs when an unauthorized person, entity or process en-
ters the system and accesses the information. Integrity refers to safeguarding
the accuracy and completeness of assets, which ensures that the information
in the system will not be modified by attacks. Availability pertains to the
property of being accessible and usable upon demand by an authorized entity.
The resources need to be kept accessible at all times to authorized entities
or processes.
Beyond cyber threats like malware, spyware, and computer viruses that
currently threaten the security of computer communication networks, the
introduction of new and distributed technologies, such as smart meters, sen-
sors, and other sub-networks can bring new vulnerabilities to a smart grid
[18]. In the three main control systems of a CI, the SCADA the central
nerve system that constantly gathers the latest status from remote units.
The communication system for wide-area protection and control of a power
grid can be blocked or cut off due to component failures or communication
delays. If one of the crucial communication channels fails to connect in the
operational environment, inability to control or operate important facilities
may occur with the possibility of power outages. In this situation, the ef-
fect of some widely known attacks can have devastating consequences on
SCADA systems. Moreover, the design of SCADA systems is different from
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conventional IT networks, even when based on the same physical technology,
such as Ethernet networks. That is, industrial control-specific protocols are
used in SCADA systems, where a limited number packet types are exchanged
between entities of the network.
Intrusion detection systems can be classified into centralized intrusion de-
tection systems (CIDS) and distributed intrusion detection systems (DIDS)
by the way in which their components are distributed [1]. A CIDS is such
that the analysis of the data will be performed in some fixed locations with-
out considering the number of hosts being monitored [14], while a DIDS is
composed of several IDS over large networks whose data analysis is performed
in a number of locations proportional to the number of hosts. As one part
of an intrusion detection system, the DIDS has specific advantages over the
CIDS. For instance, it is highly scalable and can provide gradual degradation
of service, easy extensibility and scalability [4]. It is evident that the devel-
opment of distributed IDS specifically designed for SCADA systems, being
able to ensure an adequate balance between high accuracy, low false alarm
rate and reduced network traffic overhead, is needed. The above discussion
clearly indicates that specific intrusion detection systems that reassure both
high accuracy, low rate of false alarms and decreased overhead on the network
traffic need to be designed for SCADA systems.
1.1. Motivation
Among other approaches, neural networks, support vector machines, K-
nearest neighbor (KNN) and the hidden Markov model can be used for intru-
sion detection. While existing signature-based network IDS, such as Snort
or Suricata can be effective in SCADA environments, they require specific
customization for such a purpose. Also, they are not effective against rogue
threats for which known patterns or signatures are not known. OCSVM prin-
ciples have shown great potential in the area of anomaly detection [26, 16],
being a natural extension of the support vector algorithm in the case of
unlabeled data, especially for the detection of outliers.
Social network analysis (SNA) can be used in order to discover secu-
rity policy breaches in a network and refers to the use of network theory
to analyze social networks. That is, it views social relationships in terms
of network theory, consisting of nodes, representing individual actors within
the network, and ties which represent relationships between the individu-
als, such as friendships, kinships, organizations and sexual relationships. By
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using comparative metrics of network’s structure during normal and abnor-
mal operation, we can discover security policy breaches in a network. One
can assume that network communication between nodes, constitutes a social
network of users and their applications, so the appropriate methods of social
network formal analysis can be applied [12]. In on-line social systems per-
petrators of malicious behavior often display patterns of interaction that are
quite different from regular users, which can be identified through the appli-
cation of anomaly detection techniques. Thus, in accordance [8, 7], network
anomalies can be defined as patterns of interaction that significantly differ
from the norm and in order to capture the appropriate patterns of interaction,
specific aspects of entities’ behavior are used (e.g. email analysis). Similar
to this, in a SCADA system, individual entities demonstrate a quite different
communication behavior when infected, in terms of mean packet generation
frequency (traffic burst), protocol distribution or interaction pattern.
Discovering anomalies in the context of a network system is a challeng-
ing issue due to the complexity of the environment and the different nature
of the induced attacks. Regarding node behavior related decisions it makes
sense to ask more than one decision mechanism, since this practice assures a
more trusted final decision. Ensemble systems of classifiers are widely used
for intrusion detection in networks [5, 21]. These aim to include mutually
complementary individual classifiers, which are characterized by high diver-
sity in terms of classifier structure [24], internal parameters [11] or classifier
inputs[13].
In real time systems, in addition to fast response and accuracy limited
communication between detection modules is also desirable. By sending an
explicit message for every anomaly detected, the intrusion detection mech-
anism will flood the medium with messages that will cause a delay in the
communication between entities in the SCADA system. Moreover, since the
detection mechanism needs to be sited at several locations in the SCADA
system in order to recognize the intrusion near the origin, the communica-
tion overhead caused by the detection mechanism is further increased. One
solution is the addition of a control channel, whereby these messages can be
communicated without affecting the system’s performance, but this is not al-
ways feasible. For this reason, an aggregation mechanism that groups initial
alerts and sends a limited number of messages reporting the fault/intrusion
accurately and on time is needed.
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1.2. Contributions
The present article analyzes and evaluates the performance of a recently
proposed intrusion detection mechanism, namely the IT-OCSVM [17], against
the baseline OCSVM method. The mechanism uses a central OCSVM and
a cluster of automatically produced ones, one for each source that induces
significant traffic in the system, an embedded ensemble mechanism, social
metrics, an aggregation method and a k-means clustering procedure that
categorizes aggregated alerts. The mechanism runs in a distributed way and
produces dedicated IDMEF (Intrusion Detection Message Exchange Format)
messages that report the severity of the attack detected. The proposed mech-
anism is incorporated in a distributed IDS (intrusion detection system) com-
municating with other detection and management components of the system.
IT-OCSVM is evaluated using datasets extracted from a testbed that mim-
ics a small scale SCADA system under normal and malicious operation. The
evaluation of the proposed method attests the superiority of the new struc-
ture in terms of accuracy, false alarm rate and system overhead.
The rest of this article is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the use
of OCSVM in SCADA systems; Section 3 describes the IT-OCSVM method;
Section 4 presents the simulation environment and results; an Section 5 con-
cludes the article.
2. OCSVM for intrusion detection in SCADA systems
SCADA systems (Figure 1) that tie together decentralized facilities such
as power, oil and gas pipelines as well as water distribution and wastewater
collection systems, were designed to be open, robust, and easily operated and
repaired, but not necessarily secure. Cyber-attacks against these systems are
considered extremely dangerous for critical infrastructure (CI) operation and
must be addressed in a specific way [27].
The one-class classification problem is a special case of the conventional
two class classification problem, where only data from one specific class are
available and well represented. This class is called the target class. Another
class, which is called the outlier class, can be sampled very sparsely, or even
not at all. This smaller class contains data that appear when the operation
of the system varies from normal, due to a possible attack. OCSVM [10]
possesses several advantages for processing SCADA environment data and
automates SCADA performance monitoring, which can be highlighted as:
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Figure 1: A typical SCADA system
• In the case of SCADA performance monitoring, which patterns in the
data are normal or abnormal may not be obvious to operators. Since
OCSVM does not require any signatures of data to build the detection
model it is well suited for intrusion detection in SCADA environments.
• Since the detection mechanism does not require any prior information
of the expected attack types, OCSVM is capable of detecting both
known and unknown (novel) attacks.
• In practice, training data taken from SCADA environment could in-
clude noise Samples and most of the classification based intrusion de-
tection methods are very sensitive to noise. However, the OCSVM
detection approach is robust to noise samples in the training process.
• Algorithm configuration can be controlled by the user to regulate the
percentage of anomalies expected.
• Due to the low computation time, OCSVM detectors can operate fast
enough for on line SCADA performance monitoring.
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• Typical monitoring of data of SCADA systems consists of several at-
tributes and OCSVM is capable of handling multiple attributed data.
3. IT-OCSVM detection mechanism
The main purpose of the IT-OCSVM detection mechanism is to perform
anomaly detection in a time-efficient way, with good accuracy and low over-
head, within a temporal window adequate for the nature of SCADA systems.
In order to achieve the aforementioned goals several operation stages need
to be carried out.
• Pre-processing of raw input data in order to feed the IT-OCSVM
module. The attributes in the raw data of the testbed contain all
forms: continuous, discrete, and symbolic, with significantly varying
resolution and ranges. Most pattern classification methods are not
able to process data in such a format. Hence, pre-processing is re-
quired before pattern classification models can be built. This consists
of two steps: the first involves mapping symbolic-valued attributes to
numeric-valued attributes and second is implemented scaling. Different
pre-processing techniques are used based on the characteristics of each
feature type [15].
• Selection of the most appropriate features for the training of the
IT-OCSVM model. These features are divided into content and time
based features. Since the majority of DoS and probing attacks may use
hundreds of packets, time-based features are mostly used.
• Creation of cluster of OCSVM models that are trained on discrete
sources. There are many slow probing attacks that scan the hosts using
much larger intervals, thus being able to merge into the overall traffic in
the network. As a consequence, these attacks cannot be detected using
derived time based features and in order to capture them, the raw data
after arriving in the module is split into different datasets according to
the sender of the packet. An OCSM module is created and trained for
each split dataset. The cluster of split OCSVMs run in parallel with
the central OCSVM and produce errors targeted to the specific source.
It is important to mention that a split OCSVM is not created for each
source, but only for those sources that produce high traffic in the net-
work during the training period. In order to separate significant nodes
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a threshold Ppackets is used and very source that produces a number of
packets over this threshold during the training period is marked as a
significant node. If during the testing period a source is showing big
activity, while not being marked as significant, a medium alarm is fired
for it.
• Testing of the traffic dataset that contains malicious attacks. Based
on the models created from the training phase the new dataset is tested
against normal patterns. Each OCSVM module returns a function f
that takes the value +1 in a region capturing normal data points (i.e.
for events implying normal behaviour of the SCADA system) and takes
a negative value elsewhere (i.e. for events implying abnormal behaviour
of the SCADA system).
• Ensemble of classifiers The initial outcomes of the different OCSVM
modules are combined by the ensemble based mechanism that uses
mean majority voting.
• Social analysis Social network analysis is executed based on the net-
work traces and Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient is used in order
to add weight to alerts produced from different sources.
• Fusion of the information Due to the possible existence of multiple
anomalies in a SCADA system, the outcomes of the different models
are gathered and classified in terms of importance. This importance is
derived through aggregation and k-means clustering of the outputs.
• Communication of the mechanism. In order to cooperate with
other components of the IDS the mechanism sends IDMEF files. The
created files describe the nature of the alert, in terms of importance,
the position in the system, time etc.
3.1. Ensemble system
Ensemble methods can be differentiated according to the extent each
classifier affects the others. This property indicates whether the classifiers are
dependent or independent. The first situation occurs when the outcomes of a
certain classifier affects the creation of the next [19] and the latter, when each
classifier is built independently and their results are combined in some fashion
[23]. Our proposed mechanism uses an independent ensemble mechanism.
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Apart from the central OCSVM, which is trained on the entire dataset, a
cluster of split OCSVMs is automatically created though the decomposition
of the traffic dataset into disjoint subsets 2. The idea is based on the work
of the authors in [3], who achieved high accuracy by building thousands of
classifiers trained from small subsets of data in a distributed environment
and through this decomposition high diversity of the methods is achieved.
Diversity is an essential feature of an ensemble mechanism in order to achieve
high accuracy [25].
Figure 2: Decomposition of the traffic dataset to disjoint subsets
A combination procedure is then applied so as to produce a single classi-
fication for a given instance. There exist many ensemble classification meth-
ods, e.g. majority voting, performance weighting, distribution summation
an order statistics. These methods have some advantages and disadvantages
in terms of accuracy and computational cost. In a real time system, both
parameters are crucial and for this reason a simple but effective ensemble
mechanism must be chosen [20]. In order to achieve a balance between these
two parameters the outcomes of both the central and the split OCSVMs are
combined using a simple algebraic weighted sum rule using Equation 1. The
ensemble based mechanism is represented in Figure 3.
qe(i, j) =
N∑
n=1
widt(i, j) (1)
where, dt(i, j) is the outcome of each individual classifier n for sample data
i that originates from node j and wi is the weight given to each classifier.
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Figure 3: Ensemble based system
The values that are produced from this stage are weighted using the
social analysis module, according to the Spearman’s rank coefficient for every
significant source. These values are then fed into the aggregation module.
3.2. Social analysis module
Deviation from the normal protocol operation in communication networks
has received considerable attention from the research community in recent
years. A malicious node may use the vulnerabilities of the system architec-
ture to perform different kinds of attacks. Hence, for network reliability it
necessary to develop an efficient technique to detect misbehaving clients in a
timely manner and the correlation coefficients between entities can effectively
detect malicious nodes [9].
In order to enhance the performance of the OCSVM module, parallel sta-
tistical algorithms are executed. For each significant source that is detected
during training, a list of the protocols used is created, which are ranked and
stored along with the IP/ MAC addresses of each source. During the testing
phase the same procedure is executed, thus producing a list of the protocols
used for each significant source. The two lists are compared using Spearman’s
correlation coefficient [22].
p = 1− 6
∑
d2i
n(n2 − 1) (2)
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The final output is a number qj for each source j that indicates whether
there is a differentiation in the way that each source behaves during the
training and testing period. The output of the method is a value between 1
and 0, with a number close to 1 indicating similar behaviour of the source
both in the training and testing sessions. This value is used in order to give
additional significance to alerts produced from the specific source from the
OCSVM modules (see Equation 3. In Figure 4 an example of the protocols
that are mainly used during normal and abnormal operation of a node is
presented.
qs(i, j) =
qe(i, j)
pj
,∀ qe(i, j) with source node j (3)
Figure 4: Most used protocols used by a node during normal (left) and abnormal (right)
operation
3.3. Fusion of alarms - final outputs
The OCSVM module produces one initial alarm for any deviation in net-
work traffic from normal, based on the training models that it has created.
In real time systems in addition to fast response and accuracy limited com-
munication between the detection modules is desirable. For this reason we
implement a fusion procedure which groups alerts per source node and gives
final scores to aggregated alerts based on the initial values and the number
of similar initial alerts.
The first stage of fusion consists of an aggregation mechanism that groups
individual alerts according to their origin. Each alert i has an initial value qi
(and a source j) based on the procedures described in the previous sections
3.1,3.2. Using equations 4 each aggregated alert j is assigned two values qaj
and qbj that represent its severity. This severity comes from both the sum of
the values of the initial alerts and the number of attacks that originate from
the same node.
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qaj =
∑
i
qs(i, j), qbj =
∑
i
1,∀ qs(i, j) with source node j (4)
During the second stage of fusion the system uses K-means clustering so
as to divide the alarms into: possible, medium and severe. The k-means
clustering algorithm is one of the simplest and most commonly used cluster-
ing algorithms. It is a partitional algorithm that heuristically attempts to
minimize the sum of squared errors.
SSE =
K∑
k=1
Nk∑
j=1
||qaj − µk||2 (5)
where, Nk is the number of instances belonging to cluster k and µk is the
mean of cluster k, calculated as the mean of all the instances belonging to
the cluster i
µk,i =
1
Nk
Nk∑
q=1
qaq, j ∀j (6)
The algorithm begins with an initial set of cluster centers and in each
iteration each instance is assigned to its nearest cluster center according to
the euclidean distance between the two. We use two k-means algorithms that
run in parallel which partition alerts into two categories: possible and severe.
These decisions are then combined according to the above equations and are
assigned their final classification: possible, medium or severe, according to
Figure 5.
Figure 5: K-means clustering module
Using the fusion procedure, the final alarms that the system produces are
significantly decreased and all the sources with suspect behavior are reported.
The whole procedure is described in Figure 6.
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Figure 6: Architecture of detection mechanism
In order to cooperate with the other modules the IT-OCSVM mechanism
is integrated in the PID system and communicates with the other modules
created under the ”Cockpit CI project” using IDMEF [6] files. The IDMEF
defines the experimental standard for exchanging intrusion detection related
events and a typical IDMEF file produced by our system is shown in Figure 7.
The IDMEF message contains information about the source of the intrusion,
the time of the intrusion detection, the module that detected the problem
and a classification of the detected attack. Knowledge of the source node
where the intrusion originates is a very important feature an IDS system
must have. Once the infected node is spotted the infection can be limited
by the isolation of this node from the rest of the network. Fast and accurate
detection of the source node of a contamination is crucial for the correct
function of an IDS.
3.4. Nature of the trial
The trial is conducted off line with the use of two datasets extracted
from the testbed (Figure 8. The testbed architecture mimics a small-scale
SCADA system, comprising the operations and field networks, which include
a Human-Machine Interface Station (for process monitoring), a managed
switch (with port monitoring capabilities for network traffic capture), and
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Figure 7: Typical IDMEF message produced by the IT-OCSVM mechanism
two Programmable Logic Controller Units, for process control. The NIDS
and IT-OCSVM modules are co-located on the same host, being able to
intercept all the traffic flowing in the network.
Figure 8: Architecture of the testbed
Three kinds of attacks are evaluated:
• Network scan attack In a typical network scan attack, the attacker
uses TCP/FIN scan to determine if ports are closed to the target ma-
chine; closed ports answer with RST packets while open ports discard
the FIN message. FIN packets blend with background noise on a link
and are hard to detect.
• ARP cache spoofing - MITM attack ARP cache spoofing is
a technique where an attacker sends fake ARP messages. The aim is
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to associate the attacker’s MAC address with the IP address of an-
other host, thus causing any traffic meant for that IP to be sent to
the attacker instead. The attacker could choose to inspect the pack-
ets, modify data before forwarding (man-in-the-middle attack) or
launch a denial of service attack by causing some of the packets to be
dropped.
• DoS attack Network flood refers to the situation where the attacker
floods the connection with the PLC by sending SYN packets.
4. Results and analysis
Each OCSVM that is trained produces a separate model file which is
used in order to classify new data as normal or malicious. All OCSVMs
use Gaussian RBF Kernel functions with default parameters σ = 0.01 and
ν = 0.001. The parameters used during evaluation of the proposed IT-
OCSVM detection method are shown in table 1.
Table 1: Evaluation parameters
IndepedentParamater Default value
ν 0.001
σ 0.01
Ppackets − (No of split OCSVMs) 1100(5)
Ensemble mechanism Weighted sum value
k −means 2 stages
During execution of the proposed detection mechanism, a separate file
that contains information about the split sources is also created. This file
is used in order to split the testing dataset according to the sources that
are categorized as important during training. A snapshot of the sources file
is shown in figure 9. For each row, the IP/MAC address of the source is
followed by the 5 most used protocols during the training period, which are
sorted in descending order. These protocols are compared with those used
by the same source in the testing period in order to calculate the Spearman’s
correlation coefficient value for each separate source.
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Figure 9: Sources file created by the OCSVM module
4.1. Initial network traffic analysis
In Figure 10 the rate of the injected packets in the system during normal
and abnormal operation of the SCADA system is monitored. In the lower
part of the figure, we can observe that when the DOS attack takes place, the
rate of the packets injected into the system is much higher compared to a
normal operation period.
Figure 10: Rate of packets during normal and abnormal operation time
MITM and network scan attacks, on the other hand, do not have such pro-
found consequences on the traffic rate, since they use few messages (MITM)
or they merge with the overall traffic. As can be observed from Figure 11,
an ARP spoofing attack can be identified by using feature 5 in the overall
dataset. Apart from the actual attack there are also other instances where
the central OCSVM would probably fire an alarm due to high values of this
feature.
When subsets are used the occurrence of this attack is more obvious.
In Figure 12 the values of feature 5 over time for two sources that induce
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Figure 11: ARP spoofing attack - overall dataset
significant traffic in the system are shown. The left diagram presents the
number of ARP packets sent by the intruder during the testing period, while
the right presents the same distribution for a normal node of the system.
The difference in the performance of a node under attack is more evident
using the split datasets.
Figure 12: ARP spoofing attack - split datasets
Moreover, the Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient of the source that
executes a scan attack (Network scan or ARP scan) is heavily affected since
node behavior deviates from normal in terms of protocol distribution, thus
enhancing the detection capability of our mechanism.
4.2. Method evaluation
This subsection describes the performance of the proposed OCSVM based
intrusion detection algorithm for the simulated data. During the testing
period several attack scenarios are simulated in the testbed, which include:
a network scan, a network flood and an MITM attack. Since the attacks are
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performed during different time periods we divide the testing dataset into
several smaller ones, each containing a different attack. The testing data
consists of normal and attack data and the composition of the data sets is
as follows:
• Testing set-A’ : 1 - 5000: Normal data
• Testing set-B’ : 5000 - 10000: Normal data + Arp spoofing attack +
Network scan
• Testing set-C’ : 10000 - 25000: Normal data + Flooding Dos attack
+ Network scan
• Testing set-D’ : 25000 - 41000: Normal data + MITM attack
The IT-OCSVM method, as shown in [17], performs well in terms of
detection accuracy and false positive rate 2.
Table 2: Performance evaluation of the IT-OCSVM module
Dataset DA FAR
A 98.81% 1.18%
B 94.6% 3.25%
C 95.20% 1.51%
D 96.37% 2.3%
All 96.3% 2.5%
4.3. Ensemble mechanism. Parameter Ppackets
The ensemble module affects the performance of the IT-OCSVM. Discrete
OCVSMs that are created by the mechanism have an impact on the accuracy
of the detection mechanism. Regarding which, the cluster of automatically
produced OCSVMs can be significantly large(one OCSVM per source) or
very small (a total of one or two OCSVMs) according to the value of the
parameter Ppackets. Figure 13 shows the relation between the value of the
threshold parameter Ppackets and the number of created OCSVMs as well as
how this affects the performance of the detection mechanism.
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Figure 13: Number of automatically created OCSVMs against accuracy of the mechanism
The parameter Ppackets is given a value as a proportion of the number
of rows of the entire training dataset. According to Figure 13, it is evident
that an appropriate selection of parameter Ppackets is essential for the correct
operation of the proposed mechanism. When the parameter is given a very
big value then the created OCSVMs are too few to improve accuracy and the
performance of the mechanism deteriorates. When this value is extremely
big 1
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then the mechanism degrades to a simple OCSVM module. For values
relative low the number of created OCSVMs grows without an improvement
in systems accuracy. As observed in Figure 13, when the number of created
OCSVMs is relatively large the accuracy of the mechanism drops. As split
training sets are created for sources with no significant traffic in the training
period, the OCSVMs that are created are not correctly trained and instead
of helping they harass the decision procedure. For values of the threshold
parameter between 1
40
and 1
100
the accuracy of the detection mechanism is
optimal. In fact, for these values, the accuracy of the IT-OCSVM mechanism
compared to the initial OCSVM is 6 % better. That is, the simple OCSVM
achieves accuracy of 90.7 % while the proposed IT-OCSVM reaches 96.4%
(Figure 13). Apart from the profound improvement in terms of accuracy the
proposed mechanism has other advantages compared to a simple OCSVM
module. It creates a decreased number of alarms and also categorizes these
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according to their severity, as described in the next subsection.
4.4. Impact of the fusion mechanism
The fusion of the alarms produced by the individual OCSVMs consists
of two stages. The first is aggregation of alarms per source and the second
is the clustering of them using a two stage k-means clustering algorithm, as
described in section 3.3. The outcome of the fusion procedure is the deduction
of the communicated alarms in the system and also their classification as:
possible, medium and severe. In Table 3 the number of initial and final
aggregated alarms is presented. It can be observed that the number of final
alarms is significantly lower compared to the initial ones, thus reducing the
communication costs that such a distributed mechanism have in the network.
Table 3: Aggregated alarms produced by IT-OCSVM are significantly decreased compared
to the initial ones
Dataset Initial alarms Aggregated alarms
A 129 16
B 658 21
C 9273 18
D 203 16
All 10507 22
The IT-OCSVM system categorizes alarms according to the level of sever-
ity they have, with most being classified as possible and those few originating
from real attacks in the system are termed severe (see Figure 14). Since the
proposed mechanism is part of a distributed PIDS, the information sent by
the IT-OCSVM can be combined with those sent by the other detection mod-
ules. For this reason this categorization of the alarms is important, if correct
final decisions about the situation in the network are to be taken.
4.5. Computational cost and time overhead
The complexity of an IDS can be attributed to hardware, software and
operational factors. For simplicity, it is usually estimated as the computing
time required to perform classification of the dataset and output the final
alarms. Increasing the number of classifiers usually increases the computa-
tional cost and decreases their comprehensibility. For this reason, special
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Figure 14: IT-OCSVM categorizes aggregated alarms. The left diagram shows aggre-
gated alarms created by IT-OCSVM without the additional medium alarms and the right
diagram illustrates all the final alarms created by the IT-OCSVM
care must be taken when choosing parameter Ppackets. As mentioned in sub-
section 4.3, this parameter determines the number of created split datasets
and thus, split OCSVMs. While the increase in number of split OCSVMs
does not impose any significant increase in the method’s performance, this
may slow down the detection mechanism.
In figure 15, we illustrate the time performance of the method compared
to a simple OCSVM. The evaluation was conducted on a PC with Intel core
2 duo 1.7 Mhz CPU, 2GB main memory, 80GB hard disk 7200 rpm hard
disk and Microsoft windows 7 64bit.
According to Figure 15, the execution time of the proposed IT-OCSVM
is bigger compared to a simple OCSVM method. However,or the extreme
configuration where 15 OCSVMs are created the performance gap increases
and the proposed IT-OCSVM is 75 % slower than the simple OCSVM,
whereas when the IT-OCSVM operates under the default configuration (5-6
OCSVMs) the performance gap is 55 %. Based on these observations we
conclude that the system, under the default configuration, performs a classi-
fication in a comparable time to that of a simple OCSVM classifier and thus,
it can be adopted in soft real-time applications.
We have to mention that the performance evaluation conducted in this
subsection, does not include the time that each detection mechanism needs
in order to create and disseminate IDMEF messages or the computational
and time costs that the correlator needs in order to collect and analyze the
alarms. It is evident that the OCSVM classifier, compared to the proposed
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Figure 15: Approximate execution time for the entire testing dataset
IT-OCSVM, needs significant additional time in order to send all the detected
alarms. Moreover, the categorization that is performed by the IT-OCSVM
mechanism reduces the computational load of the correlator that collects the
alarms from the distributed detection agents.
5. Conclusion
This article analyzes the IT-OCSVM mechanism and evaluates it against
the baseline method for different attack scenarios. The detection mecha-
nism, which runs in a distributed way, can be used in large SCADA net-
works with no additional modifications. The combination of social network
analysis metrics with machine learning classification techniques, enhances
the performance of the detection mechanism and improves accuracy for all
the simulation scenarios investigated. Moreover, the aggregation procedure
embedded in the proposed mechanism decreases the overhead of the IT-
OCSVM and makes it easily incorporable in a soft real time system. That is,
the method produces a small amount of final alerts and manages to detect
all the simulated attacks.
In future work the proposed mechanism will be further enhanced in order
to decrease false alarms and increase detection accuracy. It will be tested
in a bigger hybrid testbed under different attack scenarios an other behav-
22
ior patterns will be also evaluated, e.g. the patterns of interaction among
entities, thereby adding more sophistication to the detection mechanism.
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